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RES JUDICATA-CRIMINAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-DUI-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided that the Commonwealth
must appeal every final order of a district magistrate; otherwise,
res judicata bars any subsequent action.
Commonwealth v La Belle, Pa , 612 A2d 418 (1992).
On June 2, 1985, Lawrence Todd La Belle was involved in a one-
car accident.1 Eight days after this accident, the Commonwealth
charged La Belle with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI)
in violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.2 Fifteen days after
the accident, the Commonwealth also charged La Belle with driv-
ing at an unsafe speed and reckless driving in violation of the
state's Vehicle Code.' On August 23, 1985, La Belle pleaded guilty
to driving at an unsafe speed and reckless driving.4 La Belle ap-
peared before a district magistrate on August 25, 1985, and the
1. Commonwealth v La Belle, Pa • , 612 A2d 418 (1992). Immediately before
the accident, La Belle purchased gasoline at a truck stop complex. Commonwealth v La
Belle, 397 Pa Super 179, 579 A2d 1315, 1316 (1989). Subsequently, La Belle drove his car
through the complex's parking lot in a reckless and erratic fashion. La Belle, 579 A2d at
1316. La Belle then stopped at the restaurant in the complex to purchase soda. Id. A witness
saw La Belle pour the soda into a liquor bottle. Id. La Belle drove away squealing the tires
of his car; the accident occurred shortly thereafter. Id. La Belle was found to have a blood
alcohol level of .24% Id. The only individual injured in the accident was La Belle's passen-
ger, Mary Ellen Conaboy, who was rendered a quadriplegic. Id.
2. La Belle, 612 A2d at 419. The offense in Pennsylvania of DUI is defined at 75 Pa
Cons Stat § 3731 (Purdon 1992). Section 3731 provides:
A person shall not drive operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of
any vehicle while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapa-
ble of safe driving;
(2) under the influence of any controlled substance, as defined in the act of
April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as "The Controlled Substance, Drug,
Device and Cosmetic Act," to a degree which renders the person incapable of
safe driving;
(3) under the combined influence of alcohol and any controlled substance to a
degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving; or
(4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is .10% or
greater.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3731(a).
3. La Belle, 612 A2d at 419. The offense of driving at an unsafe speed and reckless
driving in Pennsylvania is defined at 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3714. Section 3714 provides:
"Any person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property
is guilty of careless driving, a summary offense." 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3714 (Purdon 1992).
4. La Belle, 612 A2d at 419.
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magistrate dismissed the DUI charge.' The district magistrate
quashed the charge based on the superior court's holding in Com-
monwealth v Revtai6 that stated when a DUI charge is not filed
within five days, as required by Pennsylvania Criminal Procedure
Rule 130,7 the court is compelled to dismiss the charge.'
Subsequent to La Belle's dismissal, the superior court on March
6, 1987 overruled Revtai in Commonwealth v Schimelfenig.9 In
Schimelfenig, the superior court held dismissal of a case based on
a late complaint under Rule 130(d) occurred only upon a showing
that the defendant had been prejudiced by the delay.10 Because
Revtai was overruled, the Commonwealth refiled (within the stat-
ute of limitations) the DUI charge against La Belle on March 18,
5. Id.
6. 343 Pa Super 149, 494 A2d 399 (1985), rev'd, 516 Pa 53, 532 A2d 1 (1987). In this
case, the defendant was arrested on May 25, 1983 and charged with DUI. Revtai, 494 A2d at
400. Revtai was not brought immediately before the issuing authority. Id. The Common-
wealth released Revtai without an arraignment pursuant to Pa R Crim P Rule 130(b), but
the Commonwealth filed a complaint six days after the arrest. Id. The court dismissed the
DUI charge holding that a defendant has the right to rely on specific time limitations as
stated by the Criminal Rules Committee. Id.
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated its approval of the superior court's deci-
sion to overrule Revtai, it indicated its strong disapproval of the superior court's rationale in
deciding that case. Commonwealth v Revtai, et al, 516 Pa 53, 532 A2d 1, 3 (1987). The state
supreme court held that the superior court interpreted incorrectly Rule 130(d) and failed to
apply Rule 150. Id. The pertinent section of Rule 150 states: "[a] defendant shall not be
discharged nor shall a case be dismissed because of a defect in the form or content of a
complaint, summons, or warrant, or a defect in the procedures of this chapter, unless the
defendant raises the defect before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing and the defect
is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant." PaRCrP Rule 150, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Pur-
don 1989).
7. The relevant sections of Rule 130 state:
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) . . . when a defendant has been arrested
without a warrant in a court case, a complaint shall be filed against the defendant
and the defendant shall be afforded a preliminary arraignment by the proper issuing
authority without unnecessary delay.
(b) When a defendant has been arrested without a warrant for driving under the
influence of alcohol or controlled substances, the arresting officer may, when he
deems it appropriate, promptly release the defendant from custody rather than tak-
ing him before the issuing authority.
(d) When a defendant is released pursuant to paragraphs (b) ... a complaint shall be
filed against the defendant within five (5) days of the defendant's release. Thereafter,
a summons, not a warrant of arrest, shall be issued and the case shall proceed as
provided in Rule 110.
PaRCrP Rule 130(d), 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989).
8. La Belle, 612 A2d at 419.
9. 361 Pa Super 325, 522 A2d 605 (1987). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court shortly
thereafter affirmed the superior court's overruling of Revtai. See note 6.
10. Schimelfenig, 522 A2d at 609.
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1987.11 The trial court quashed the charge on double jeopardy
grounds because La Belle had pled guilty of driving at an unsafe
speed and reckless driving. The superior court, however, reversed
the trial court's decision leading to this appeal.
11. La Belle, 612 A2d at 419. The trial court quashed the charge on double jeopardy
grounds. La Belle, 579 A2d at 1316. The superior court reversed this decision. Id. The issue
the superior court dealt with was whether La Belle's guilty plea to summary offenses of
driving a vehicle at an unsafe speed and reckless driving in violation of the vehicle code
preclude the Commonwealth from maintaining a subsequent action, arising from the same
accident, against La Belle for DUI. Id.
The superior court focused on double jeopardy clause with respect to La Belle's guilty
plea to reckless driving and driving at an unsafe speed. La Belle, 579 A2d at 1320.
The relevant part of Amendment V is no person shall "be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . US Const, Amend V.
Double jeopardy is defined as:
Fifth Amendment guarantee, enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects against second prosecution for same offense after acquittal or
conviction, and against multiple punishments for same offense. The evil sought of be
avoided is double trial and double conviction, not necessarily double punishment.
Black's Law Dictionary 91 (West, 6th ed 1991).
The superior court's double jeopardy analysis of this case began with the test established
by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299 (1932). Justice Suther-
land, writing for the United States Supreme Court, noted that:
the applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not.
Blockburger, 284 US at 304.
The superior court emphasized that the Blockburger test focuses on the statutory ele-
ments of the offense at issue. La Belle, 579 A2d at 1320. Furthermore, the court stated that
if one offense, as defined by the statute, requires additional proof beyond the other offense,
as defined by the statute, the Blockburger test is satisfied irrespective of the substantial
overlap between the two crimes. Id at 1320 citing Jamelli v United States, 420 US 770, 785
n 17 (1975).
The court held that the blood alcohol level is an essential element of DUI but not an
essential element of reckless driving. La Belle, 579 A2d at 1323. In addition, the court noted
that the act of driving a vehicle is an essential element of reckless driving while this element
is not an essential element of DUI because section 3731 was amended in 1982 to include
driving, operating, or controlling the movement of the vehicle. Id. Therefore, the court as-
serted that the prosecution passed the Blockburger test. Id.
The superior court noted that in addition to the Blockburger test, double jeopardy "bars
a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted." La Belle, 579 A2d at 1320. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the double jeopardy clause barred the state from any subsequent indictment
when the prosecution proved conduct (to establish the prima facia case of the offense
charged), for which the defendant had already been prosecuted. Id.
The court also noted that La Belle failed to demonstrate that his first conviction had been
based upon his blood alcohol level or the affect of alcohol on his driving. Id. Therefore, the
court reasoned that the charges brought against La Belle were not barred by double jeop-
ardy. Id.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concentrated on the issue of
whether res judicata barred the Commonwealth from filing DUI
charges against the defendant when this charge was previously dis-
missed by a district magistrate and the Commonwealth failed to
appeal this dismissal. 2
The Commonwealth, however, argued that the earlier dismissal
was not final but interlocutory, and thus, it was, not appealable.13
The Commonwealth noted that "the general rule ... that an order
dismissing a case for failure to establish a prima facie case is not
final because the prosecution can bring the case before any other
officer empowered to hold a preliminary hearing." 4 The court
agreed with the Commonwealth's general rule; however, it dis-
agreed that it applied to this case.1 5
Justice Flaherty, writing the majority opinion for the court, indi-
cated that a prima facie case dealt with the presentation of evi-
dence which, if true, would sustain the charge. 6 Justice Flaherty
noted "[t]raditionally, the failure to make a prima facie case has
been treated as an interlocutory matter, for at the time it is deter-
mined that the prosecution's evidence is deficient, jeopardy has not
attached and the state is not out of court because of the adverse
determination."17 Under this rule, the Commonwealth could add to
its evidence and resubmit the charges against the defendant.18
The court, however, refused to apply this rule to the present case
because it was dismissed based on the application of a rule of law
handed down by the superior court to the facts of this case. 9 The
supreme court noted that under the elements of the present case,
the Commonwealth could not have added to its evidence and re-
submitted to another magistrate to cure the defect.2 0 Justice Fla-
12. La Belle, 612 A2d at 419. This issue was addressed by Judge Brosky in his dis-
senting opinion for the superior court. La Belle, 579 A2d at 1324. Brosky asserted that the
majority opinion overlooked the concept of res judicata. Id. Brosky noted that the Common-
wealth's failure to comply with Rule 130(d) was final but an appealable decision. Id. How-
ever, because the Commonwealth failed to appeal this order, the decision "became final, in
essence, forevermore." Id.
13. La Belle, 612 A2d at 419.
14. Id at 419 citing Commonwealth v Hetherington, 460 Pa 17, 331 A2d 205 (1975).
15. La Belle, 612 A2d at 419-20. The supreme court indicated that rearresting the
defendant was the appropriate procedure when charges were dismissed due to failure to
establish a prima facie case because such a determination is interlocutory in nature, and
therefore, not appealable. Id.




20. Id. The state supreme court indicated that the error was curable only if the mag-
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herty asserted that the proper remedy was to have appealed the
magistrate's dismissal.2 Because the Commonwealth failed to ap-
peal this dismissal, res judicata barred the Commonwealth from
recharging the defendant.
2
The Commonwealth's second argument was based on Rule 150
of Pennsylvania's Rules of Criminal Procedure as interpreted by
Commonwealth v Mirarchi.25 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Mirarchi held that "where . . . dismissal of the charges and dis-
charge of the defendant resulted from a determination that the
complaint contained a 'substantive defect' rearrest was an appro-
priate, if not the only procedure available to the Common-
wealth."2 ' The Commonwealth in La Belle asserted that the viola-
tion of the five day rule was a "substantive defect" in the
complaint thus permitting the Commonwealth to refile the charges
against La Belle.25 The court dismissed this argument stating that
defects in the complaint were not an issue.21 Justice Flaherty indi-
cated that this argument did not apply to the case at bar; instead,
the primary issue was whether the Commonwealth may refile the
charges against the defendant when the state failed to appeal a
final order that dismissed the charges against the defendant.27
In this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the
predominantly civil doctrine of res judicata to a criminal case;
however, the common law doctrine of res judicata or collateral es-
toppel28 has been applied to criminal cases dating back to late
istrate's application of superior court's rule had been in error or unless the superior court's
rule was itself an error. Id.
21. Id. Justice Flaherty supported his position by noting two rules of law. Id. First, if
a magistrate when dismissing a case committed an error of law, the proper remedy was to
appeal that decision. Id. Second, if an appellate court established an incorrect rule of law,
the magistrate must nonetheless apply that rule, and the proper remedy was to appeal to
the appellate court to seek reversal of its rule. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id at 420 n 1. When Commonwealth v Mirarchi, 481 Pa 385, 392 A2d 1346 (1978),
was decided, Rule 150 provided: "[i]f a complaint, citation, summons or warrant contains a
substantive defect, the defendant shall be discharged unless he waives the defect. Nothing
in this rule shall prevent the filing of a new complaint or citation and the issuance of process
in which the defect is corrected in a proper manner." PaRCrP Rule 150, 42 Pa Cons Stat
Ann (Purdon 1969) as quoted in Mirarchi, 392 A2d at 1347 n 1. The Pennsylvania legisla-
ture amended Rule 150 in 1981; see note 6 for the present text of this rule.
24. La Belle, 612 A2d at 420 n 1 quoting Mirarchi, 392 A2d at 1348.
25. La Belle, 612 A2d at 420 n 1.
26. Id.
27. Id. Justice McDermott noted his dissent. Id at 420.
28. The term "res judicata" embraces the effect of a judgment precluding the parties
and their privies from relitigating in a subsequent action a controversy or issue already
decided by a former judgment. Res Judicata-Criminal Cases 9 ALR3d 213 (1966).
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nineteenth century England. In Wemyss v Hopkins,2 9 the English
court stated the well-established common law rule of res judicata
as: where a person has been convicted and punished for a crime by
a court of competent jurisdiction, the conviction barred subsequent
proceedings for the same offense.30 Otherwise, the court reasoned
there might be two different punishments for the same offense.31
The English courts expanded the application of res judicata to
criminal cases in The Queen v Miles.3 2 The defendant in that case
had been brought before a court of summary jurisdiction on four
counts of assault and released when he agreed to good behavior s
Subsequently, the defendant was charged with the identical
charges and brought before the central criminal court.34 The court
considered the issue of whether the doctrine of res judicata barred
the proceeding in the central criminal court when the defendant
had already been tried before a court of summary jurisdiction. 5
The court dismissed the charges and stated that a person who had
The rule of collateral estoppel is an aspect of the broader principle of res judicata. Collat-
eral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by
a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in
any future suit. Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 443 (1970). Even if the offense charged is not
exactly the same as the one previously tried, the principle of collateral estoppel bars relitiga-
tion by the parties of issues actually determined at the previous trial. Ashe, 397 US at 443-
44.
To have the effect of res judicata, a judgment in a criminal case must have been rendered
in a judicial trial. Id. As with a civil action, the doctrine of res judicata in criminal cases
applies to subsequent criminal proceeding only where both proceedings are identical. Com-
monwealth v Quaranta, 295 Pa 264, 145 A 89 (1928).
The doctrine of res judicata as applied to criminal cases was not fully appreciated in all
jurisdictions. Marlyn E. Luger, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 Iowa
L Rev 317, 329 (1954). In addition, several jurisdictions did not apply res judicata as a
separate concept of double jeopardy until the mid twentieth century. Luger, 39 Iowa L Rev
at 329. In fact, most treaties and casebooks fail to discuss the application of res judicata to
criminal law. Id.
29. 38 LR QB 378 (1875). In Wemyss, the defendant was summarily convicted for
unlawfully and willfully striking a horse ridden by the victim. Wemyss, 38 LR QB at 378.
Thereafter, the defendant was convicted under the same facts for unlawfully assaulting vic-
tim. Id. Wemyss was not the first English case that considered res judicata to criminal law.
The Duchess of Kingston Case, 20 St Tr 355 (1776), was the first case that discussed the
application of res judicata to a criminal case.
30. Wemyss, 38 LR QB at 381.
31. Id.
32. 24 QBD 423 (1890).
33. Miles, 24 QBD at 423-24. The charges against the defendant were: unlawfully and
maliciously wounding the victim, unlawfully inflicting grievous bodily harm on the victim,
assaulting the victim causing him actual bodily harm, and a common assault on the victim.
Id at 423.
34. Id.
35. Id at 424.
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been convicted of assault by a court of summary jurisdiction but
had been discharged without any sentence of fine or imprisonment
cannot thereafter be convicted on an indictment for the same
charges."
The United States Supreme Court, citing the Miles case, first
applied the doctrine of res judicata to a criminal case in United
States v Oppenheimer.5 7 In this case, the defendant, along with
several others, had been indicted for a conspiracy to conceal assets
from a trustee in bankruptcy.36 However, the court held that the
one-year statute of limitations to bring such a charge had run.3 9
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v Rabinowich,0 the court held
that the statute of limitations for this act had been incorrectly ap-
plied. 1 The government refiled the charges against the defendant
and argued that the doctrine of res judicata did not exist for crimi-
nal cases except within the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion. 2 The Court held that, even though jeopardy had not at-
tached, a plea that the statute of limitations had run was a plea to
the merits.' s Thus, the Court reasoned that once there had been a
final judgment, the government could not refile the charges against
the defendants." The Court indicated that the proper remedy for
the government was to appeal the decision to dismiss the case
based on the judgment that the statute of limitations had run."
The Supreme Court expanded the criminal law aspect of res
judicata in Ashe v Swenson.'6 In this case, the Court first applied
36. Id at 425-26.
37. 242 US 85 (1916).
38. Oppenheimer, 242 US at 85.
39. Id at 86.
40. 238 US 78 (1915).
41. Oppenheimer, 242 US at 86.
42. Id at 87. See note 11 for the relevant section of Amendment V and the definition
of double jeopardy.
43. Oppenheimer; 242 US at 87.
44. Id at 87-88. The Court also noted that the Fifth Amendment was not intended to
do away with the civil law principle that when a person has been acquitted on the merits,
the government was barred from prosecuting the defendant a second time on an identical
charge. Id.
45. Id.
46. 397 US 436 (1970). In this case, on January 10, 1960 six men were playing poker.
Ashe, 397 US at 437. Three or four armed masked men suddenly appeared. Id. These men
subsequently robbed the poker players. Id. The men escaped in a car that was later discov-
ered abandoned a few miles from the robbery site. Id. Later, a state trooper arrested three
men who were walking on the highway not far from the abandoned car. Id. The defendant,
however, was arrested by another officer a short distance from the others. Id. It was never
clear whether there were three or four robbers. Id.
1993
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collateral estoppel to a criminal trial.' The defendant was indicted
for robbery of one individual, but .at the trial the jury found the
defendant not guilty based on insufficient evidence.' Six weeks
later, the state brought the defendant to trial for robbery of an-
other individual during the same incident as the first case. 4'9 The
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to thirty-five years in
jail.50 The defendant appealed.51 Upon granting the defendant writ
of certiorari, the court considered the issue of whether a State is
permitted to indict the defendant on robbery charges when a jury
had already determined that the defendant was not the robber.2
Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion, noted that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel represented an important aspect of
American jurisprudence s.5  He declared that collateral estoppel was
part of the defendant's Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy. 4 Justice Stewart concluded that applying collateral es-
toppel to criminal cases will prevent a defendant who had already
been convicted from having to "run the gantlet [sic]" another
time. 5 The Court concluded that even though the second trial
dealt with the robbery of a different individual, the name of this
victim had no affect on the issue of whether the defendant was
actually the robber.56
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania
courts began to develop the doctrine of res judicata at an earlier
47. Id at 442.
48. Id at 438-39. The defendant was charged with seven separate offenses- six counts
of robbery for each poker player and theft of an automobile. Id at 438. The instant case
dealt with a robbery charge against one of the robbers. Id. None of the poker players who
testified ever saw the face of the defendant. Id.
49. Id at 439. At the second trial, the witnesses were basically the same; however,
their testimony was stronger in the second prosecution than it was in the first prosecution.
Id at 439-40.
50. Id at 440.
51. Id at 440-41. The defendant prior to this case, appealed his criminal conviction to
the Missouri Supreme Court which affirmed the conviction. State v Ashe, 403 SW2d 589
(Mo 1966). Subsequently, the defendant brought a federal habeas corpus proceeding, but
the district court denied this writ. Ashe v Swenson, 289 F Supp 871 (WD Mo 1967). The
court of appeals affirmed. Ashe v Swenson, 399 F2d 40 (8th Cir 1968).
52. Ashe, 397 US at 446.
53. Id at 443.
54. Id at 445. Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion argued that collateral
estoppel is not inherent in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. Id at
464. He asserted that if collateral estoppel was a part of the Fifth Amendment, the Ameri-
can courts have ignored this fact for over two centuries. Id (Burger Dissenting).
55. Id at 446.
56. Id at 446.
632 Vol. 31:625
1993 Recent Decisions-
date in Dinkey v Commonwealth.5 7 The Dinkey court considered
whether it should sustain a defendant's plea of autrefois acquit
58
when the defendant was acquitted of seduction but subsequently
charged with fornication and bastardy.59 The state supreme court
noted the principle that "[t]he right not to be put in jeopardy a
second time for the same cause, is as sacred as the right of trial by
jury, and is guarded with as much care by the common law and by
the constitution."60 The court indicated that seduction was an as-
pect of both fornication and bastardy.61 The court determined that
the former acquittal barred the commonwealth from charging the
defendant a second time.2 Thus, the supreme court reasoned that
the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence had already been
fully litigated, and therefore, a second prosecution should be
barred. 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further expanded the doctrine
of res judicata with regards to criminal law in Commonwealth v
Lloyd. 4 In Lloyd, the court considered the issue of whether the
Commonwealth could bring a charge of bastardy in one county
when the defendant had been acquitted in a preceding trial in an-
other county for the same offense. 5 The defendant entered a plea
57. 17 Pa 126 (1851). The court did not specifically state it was applying the doctrine
of res judicata; nonetheless, the court applied the collateral estoppel aspect of res judicata
without labeling it as such. See note 28. In Dinkey, the defendant was first charged with the
offense of seduction. Dinkey, 17 Pa at 127. The defendant was acquitted on this charge. Id
at 126. Subsequently, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with fornication and bas-
tardy. Id at 128. The defendant entered a plea of autrefois, but the court convicted the
defendant of fornication and bastardy, and the defendant appealed. Id.
58. Autrefois convicts is defined as "[f]ormerly convicted. A plea by a criminal in bar
to an indictment that he has been formerly convicted of the same crime." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 91 (West, 6th ed 1991).
Autrefois acquit is defined as "[flormerly acquitted. The name of a plea in bar to a crimi-
nal action, stating that the defendant has been once already indicted and tried for the same
alleged offense and has been acquitted." Black's Law Dictionary 91 (West, 6th ed 1991).
59. Dinkey, 17 Pa at 128.
60. Id.
61. Id at 130.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 141 Pa 28 (1891). In this case, the Commonwealth brought the charges of bas-
tardy and fornication against the defendant in Luzerne County. Lloyd, 141 at 29. The child,
who was born as a result of this charge, was born in Lackawanna County. Id. The court
noted that the law required the charges of bastardy to be brought in the county where the
child was born. Id. Therefore, the court acquitted the defendant of the bastardy charge but
convicted him of fornication. Id. The Commonwealth subsequently charged the defendant in
Lackawanna County of the bastardy charge. Id at 29-30.
65. Id.
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of autrefois convict. 6 The court noted that fornication and bas-
tardy crimes resulted from the same single act.67 The court as-
serted that the Commonwealth was prevented from prosecuting
the defendant in one county for the bastardy charge and another
county for the fornication charge because these charges were insep-
arable."8 The court concluded that the state was bound by its deci-
sion to indict the defendant in the first county."9
The Pennsylvania courts, however, did not establish rules for ap-
plying res judicata to criminal cases until Commonwealth v
Moon. 0 In this case, the superior court expounded that a verdict
and judgment under an indictment was considered a final adjudi-
cation of the defendant's guilt or innocence.7 ' The court declared
this rule applied both to trials that ended in convictions and trials
that ended in acquittals. 72 Based on the common law doctrine of
res judicata, the court asserted that under such circumstances the
state was not permitted to refile the charges against the defend-
ant.78 If the government did refile charges under such circum-
stances against the defendant, the court noted the defendant
would be permitted to enter a plea of autrefois convict or autrefois
acquit.7 4 The superior court commented that the doctrine of res
judicata was designed to avoid "waste and vexation of relitigating
issues already decided between the same parties. '75 The court sup-
ported its reasoning by noting that the doctrine of res judicata
coupled with the plea of autrefois acquit was based upon the
maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa (no man should be
66. Id. The defendant Was brought before the lower court which entered a judgment
in favor of the defendant's plea of autrefois. Id. The Commonwealth appealed. Id. See note
58 for definition of autrefois convict.
67. Id at 29-30.
68. Id at 30.
69. Id.
70. 151 Pa Super 555, 30 A2d 704 (1943). In the instant case, the defendant was
indicted on a charge of adultery, and a jury found the defendant not guilty. Moon, 30 A2d at
707. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted for forcible rape allegedly perpetrated on the
same woman who was the subject of the first indictment. Id. The defendant argued that the
two indictments were identical, and therefore, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Id at
708. However, the court held that the second charge was not barred because neither offense
charged in the indictments against the defendant contained an essential element of the
other. Id at 710.
71. Id at 709 quoting Commonwealth v Rockafellow, 3 Pa Super 588, 593 (1897).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id at 709-10. See note 58.
75. Id at 710.
Vol. 31:625
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twice harrassed for same cause). 6 Accordingly, the court concluded
that a verdict and judgment under an indictment would be consid-
ered a final adjudication of the question of guilt or innocence of
the defendant. 7 Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied the defendant's application for allocatur 8
Interestingly, the Pennsylvania state courts have not been con-
fronted with many issues pertaining to res judicata in criminal law;
thus, the courts did not fully apply the rules established by the
superior court in Moon until twenty-two years later in Common-
wealth v Wydo. 79 In Wydo, res judicata was applied to timely ap-
peals in criminal law cases decided by a demurrer.80 In this case,
on June 17, 1964, the trial court entered an order sustaining the
defendant's demurrer.81 The Commonwealth appealed this order
on December 18, 1964.82 At the time of this case, Pennsylvania law
provided that no appeal from a sentence or order would be allowed
in any case unless the appeal was filed within forty-five days from
the entry of the sentence or order.83 The issue before the court was
whether the Commonwealth could appeal an order sustaining.a de-
murrer when it had failed to appeal within forty-five days.84 The
court held that the Commonwealth was permitted to appeal such
an order; however, because the state had failed to make a timely
appeal, the doctrine of res judicata barred this instant appeal.8 "
The court asserted the rule that an order sustaining a demurrer
was final and the Commonwealth had the right to appeal without
any further action on the part of the court below. 6 The superior
court noted that where no timely appeal was taken the matter be-
came res judicata.
87
Under very similar circumstances, the superior court affirmed
76. Id at 710 citing US v McConnell, 10 F2d 927 (ED Pa 1926).
77. Id at 709 quoting Rockafellow.
78. Id at 712.
79. 205 Pa Super 62, 208 A2d 12 (1965).
80. Wydo, 208 A2d at 13.
81. Id at 13.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court referred to 12 Pa Stat § 1136 (Purdon 1953) which provided: "No
appeal shall be allowed, in any case, from a sentence or order of any court of quarter ses-
sions or oyer and terminer, unless taken within forty-five days from the entry of the sen-
tence or order." 12 Pa Stat § 1136 (Purdon 1953) (repealed July 31, 1970).
84. Wydo, 208 A2d at 13-14.
85. Id.




the holding in Wydo in Commonwealth v Yahnert.s8 The issue
before the court was whether the Commonwealth could re-indict
the defendant on a charge to which a demurrer had been sustained
and no appeal had been taken by the Commonwealth."9 The court
concluded that the second indictment was barred.90 Again, the
court stated that an order sustaining a demurrer was final and the
Commonwealth had the right to appeal without any further action
on the part of the court below. The superior court commented that
where no timely appeal was taken, the matter became res
judicata.9 1
The superior court had also applied the doctrine of res judicata
in Commonwealth v Andrews.92 In Andrews, the court of common
pleas dismissed criminal charges against a defendant because the
Commonwealth had violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial
pursuant to Rule 1100." The Commonwealth failed to appeal this
dismissal, but instead, petitioned the lower court to reconsider its
refusal to grant an extension of time to commence the trial and its
dismissal of the defendant.94 Subsequently, the court below re-
scinded the dismissal and the criminal charges were reinstated
against the defendant.9 5 The superior court reversed this order be-
cause dismissal predicated on Rule 1100 had been a final order,
and therefore, the reinstatement of the charges against the defend-
88. 216 Pa Super 159, 264 A2d 180 (1970). In the instant case, the defendant was
indicted on March 4, 1968. Yahnert, 264 A2d at 181. On March 21, the case went to trial,
and the defendant entered a demurrer to the evidence. The judge sustained the demurrer.
Id. The Commonwealth failed to appeal the decision, but instead, refiled the charges against
the defendant on September 3, 1968. Id. Subsequently, the trial court convicted Yahnert. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id at 182.
91. Id. The dissent argued that the defendant failed to raise the defense of res judi-
cata; thus, waiving the defense of autrefois acquit. Id (Wright dissenting). See note 58.
92. 251 Pa Super 162, 380 A2d 428 (1977).
93. Andrews, 380 A2d at 428. The relevant part of Rule 1100 requires that: "[T]rial
in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant, where the de-
fendant is incarcerated, shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from
the date on which the complaint was filed." PaRCrP Rule 1100, 42 Pa Cons Stat (Purdon
1989).
In Andrews, the defendant on October, 25, 1974 was charged with failing to support his
children. Andrews, 380 A2d at 428. On April 16, 1975, the Commonwealth petitioned the
court for an extension of time to commence the trial against the defendant because the 180
day time period to begin a trial pursuant to Rule 1100 was ending. Id. The court granted
this extension. Id. However, on July 29, 1975, the Commonwealth requested another exten-
sion to commence the trial. Id at 429. The court of common pleas denied this petition and
the defendant was dismissed. Id.
94. Id at 429.
95. Id at 428.
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ant would be barred by res judicata.9 The court indicated that the
proper procedure would have been to appeal the dismissal of the
defendant."7
Therefore, without much precedent, the doctrine of res judicata
was applied to the recent DUI case of Commonwealth v La Belle.
However, the limited legal precedent that did exist never modified
the elements of res judicata that were established in civil law.
Justice Steward, in his majority opinion in Ashe,9e held that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel was part of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.9 9 Even though as-
pects of the doctrine of res judicata could possibly be embodied in
the Fifth Amendment, the essential elements of the doctrine still
must be satisfied. In La Belle, the charges against the defendant
had been dismissed because the state failed to comply with the five
day rule. This decision was not an adjudication to the merits.100
Furthermore, jeopardy never attached to the proceeding.101
The superior court outlined the rules for applying res judicata to
criminal case in Moon, and the court required that for res judicata
to apply there must be a judgment on the merits. 02 In fact, the
application of res judicata to cases decided by a demurrer such as
the Wydo and Yahnert cases were considered judgments on the
merits. 0 1 The United States Supreme Court, in Oppenheimer, ap-
96. Id at 429 quoting Wydo.
97. Id quoting Commonwealth v Fox, 181 Pa Super 292, 298 (1956).
98. See notes 46 - 56 and accompanying text.
99. See note 54. Judge Brosky, in his dissenting opinion in the superior court's La
Belle decision, noted that both concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel are "firmly
intertwined with the constitutional protections of due process and double jeopardy." La
Belle, 579 A2d at 1327 n 5. He further commented that "there is strong reason to believe
that the United States Supreme Court would consider res judicata . . . embodied in the
double jeopardy protection." Id. However, there was no legal precedent that supports
Brosky's assertion that the entire concept of res judicata is part of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. In fact, there is disagreement on whether
the collateral estoppel aspect of res judicata is included within the Fifth Amendment.
100. La Belle, 579 A2d at 1324-25 n 2. Judge Brosky noted that dismissal based on the
five day rule "can in no way be construed as an adjudication on the merits or the equivalent
of an acquittal upon the facts." Id at 1325 n 2.
101. Jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn, and if the case is tried
without a jury, jeopardy attaches when the first witness has been sworn. Wayne R. LaFave
and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 24(1)(c) at 900-01 '(West 1985).
102. The court noted that res judicata applied when every fact was conclusively deter-
mined. Moon, 30 A2d at 709. The court noted "[a] verdict and judgment, whether a convic-
tion or acquittal, under an indictment, was a final adjudication of the question at issue-
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This question, thus being res judicata, cannot again
be tried." Id.
103. Justice Holmes, writing the opinion in Oppenheimer declared "we do not suppose
1993
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plied res judicata to a criminal case where the statute of limitation
had run, and likewise, the court barred the subsequent indictment
because the former prosecution was considered a final judgment on
the merits. 10 4 Therefore, the essential elements of res judicata are
identical parties, final judgment, and judgment on the merits.10 5
Judge Brosky in his dissenting opinion for the superior court in
La Belle argued that Andrews06 provided precedent that a judg-
ment on the merits was not necessary for the court to apply res
judicata if the prior judgment had been final. 10 7 Judge Brosky con-
cluded that because the court applied the doctrine of res judicata
to a case which the court dismissed and a judgment on the merits
had not occurred, the court's decision was of "great signifi-
cance."108 However, the defendant in Andrews was dismissed by a
court of common pleas judge with prejudice which is considered a
judgment on the merits.10 9 In contrast, there was never any indica-
tion that the original dismissal of La Belle was with prejudice, and
furthermore, La Belle was dismissed by a district justice not a
that it would be doubted that a judgment upon a demurrer to the merits [emphasis added]
would be a bar to a second indictment . . ." Oppenheimer, 242 US at 87.
104. Id. Holmes noted: "a judgment for the defendant upon the grounds that the pros-
ecution is barred goes to his liability as matter of substantive law, and one judgment that he
is free as matter of substantive law is as good as another. A plea of the statute of limitations
is a plea to the merits." Id.
La Belle in his Brief claimed that the fact the defendant in Oppenheimer was dismissed
because the statute of limitations had run was controlling in his case. Appellant's Brief at
18-20. La Belle argued that a dismissal based on the fact that the statute of limitations had
run was not a judgment on the merits; however, this is contrary to the holding of Oppen-
heimer. Appellant's Brief at 18-19.
105. Restatement of Judgments (Second) section 20 provides:
(1) A personal judgment for the defendant, although valid and final, does not bar
another action by the plaintiff on the same claim:
(a) When the judgment is one of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper
venue, or for nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties; or
(b) When the plaintiff agrees to or elects a nonsuit (or voluntary dismissal)
without prejudice or the court directs that the plaintiff be nonsuited (or that
the action be otherwise dismissed) without prejudice; or
(c) When by statute or rule of court the judgment does not operate as a bar to
another action on the same claim, or does not so operate unless the court speci-
fies, and no such specification is made.
Restatement of Judgments (Second) § 20 (1982).
106. See note 92 and accompanying text. Actually Judge Brosky cites to Common-
wealth v Bellamy, 251 Pa Super 165, 380 A2d 429 (1977) which is a clerical error. La Belle,
579 A2d at 1324; see also Appellant's Brief at 18-20.
107. La Belle, 579 A2d at 1324-25 n 2.
108. Id.
109. Restatement of Judgments (Second) § 20(b) (cited in note 105). The defendant in
Andrews was dismissed based on Rule 1100. This was considered a dismissal with prejudice.
See Commonwealth v Senft, 404 Pa Super 499, 591 A2d 318 (1991).
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court of common pleas judge. 110
Unlike Judge Brosky, Justice Flaherty in his majority opinion
for the supreme court failed to cite any case where res judicata
barred the Commonwealth from refiling the charges against a de-
fendant where the statute of limitations had not run but the de-
fendant was previously dismissed by a judgment that was not con-
sidered a judgment on the merits. In this case, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court went beyond the constitutional issue of double
jeopardy and applied the doctrine of res judicata. In doing so, the
court ignored the fact that an essential element of res judicata was
not satisfied.
Pursuant to the court's decision, the Commonwealth must now
appeal every final order from a district justice even if jeopardy has
not attached. Furthermore, the Commonwealth must appeal even
if the judgment was not on the merits. The only requirement is
that the decision was final.
An example of an alternate sensible approach to the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court was shown in Williams v City of Peach Tree."'
In this case, the defendant filed a petition with the trial court to
review his conviction of driving under the influence and driving
without insurance."' However, the trial court dismissed the DUI
petition for lack of jurisdiction because the defendant filed one ap-
plication to review two separate convictions.1 ' Subsequently, the
defendant filed a separate petition seeking review of this DUI con-
viction.."' The trial court dismissed this petition on res judicata
grounds.1 The court of appeals reversed because, although the
first dismissal was a final appealable decision, it was not an adjudi-
cation on the merits. 116
The La Belle case comes at a time when the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has struck down DUI convictions as unconstitutional.
The court has also reversed DUI convictions on other grounds
which have severely weakened Pennsylvania's drunk driving laws.
110. The fact that La Belle was dismissed by a district magistrate and not a court of
common pleas judge may not seem important. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth may not
have been put on sufficient notice of the need to appeal a pretrial dismissal from a district
justice as the Commonwealth would be by a dismissal in the court of common pleas.
111. 192 Ga App 121, 385 SE2d 680 (1989).
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For example, in Commonwealth v Eisenhart,'1 7 the court held that
a driver may revoke the implied consent to submit to a blood alco-
hol test as provided by the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code."1 8 Subse-
quently, in Commonwealth v Kohl v Danforth,19 the court held
that Pennsylvania's Implied Consent Law violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution120 and Article I, sec-
tion 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 2 ' Finally, in Common-
wealth v Jarman22 and Commonwealth v Modaffare1 23 the court
117. Pa ,611 A2d 681 (1992). In this case, the defendant crashed into a cement
wall. Eisenhart, 611 A2d at 681. The arresting officer noticed that the defendant's eyes were
dilated and the defendant had difficulty maintaining his balance. Id at 682. When the officer
requested the defendant's license, he produced his social security card. Id. The officer also
noticed an open beer can in the front seat of the car. Id. At the hospital, the defendant
refused to submit to a blood test; nonetheless, the district attorney directed the hospital
staff to conduct the test. Id. The defendant was found to have a blood alcohol level of .293%
Id.
118. Id at 683. The Implied Consent Law provides that a driver of a motor-vehicle in
Pennsylvania has consented to blood or bodily fluid testing for the purpose of determining
the presence of a controlled substance. 75 Pa Cons Stat § 1547 (Purdon 1992).
119. Pa , 615 A2d 308 (1992). These cases were consolidated on appeal to the
state supreme court. In the Kohl case, the defendant was convicted of two counts of homi-
cide by vehicle, two counts of driving under the influence, and reckless driving'and driving
at an unsafe speed. Kohl, 615 A2d at 308. The defendant's convictions arose from a one-
vehicle collision when the defendant drove around a sharp bend and struck a pole and re-
taining wall. Id at 310. The accident resulted in the deaths of the defendant's two passen-
gers. Id. The defendant, who was left unconscious because of the accident, was transported
to the hospital. Id. Blood was taken from the defendant in the process of treating him for
his injuries, and the police requested a sample of the defendant's blood. Id. A subsequent
blood test revealed that the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .15% Id.
In the Danforth case, the defendant was involved in a one-car accident. Id. The defend-
ant's passenger was killed in the accident. Id. The defendant claimed that her passenger
attempted to remove her clothes while she was driving which caused her to loose control of
her car. Id. The officer requested the defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test because
the accident resulted in a fatality. Id at 311. The blood test revealed that the defendant had
a blood alcohol level of .214% Id. The officer never informed the defendant that she was
under criminal investigation. Id.
120. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
US Const, Amend IV.
121. Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any
person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa Const, Art I, § 8.
122. 529 Pa 92, 601 A2d 1229 (1992). In this case, a state trooper stopped the defend-
ant at 9:11 p.m. when the trooper noticed the defendant's car had a burned out headlight.
Jarman, 601 A2d at 1229. Subsequently, the trooper detected an odor of alcohol on the
640
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held that the defendant's blood alcohol level taken approximately
one hour after the arrest was not an accurate reflection of the de-
fendant's blood alcohol level at the time the defendant was
stopped." 4
The supreme court's decision in La Belle is clearly inconsistent
with prior decisions. There was no violation of the double jeopardy
clause; the elements of res judicata were not satisfied; and there
was no succession of trials or repetition of litigation. But this deci-
sion has resulted in a travesty of justice.
What makes this holding even more alarming is the possible neg-
ative impact it will have upon resolving the problem of drunk driv-
ing and the damage drunk drivers inflict upon innocent victims. In
1990 in Pennsylvania, there were 16,382 alcohol related traffic acci-
dents; almost 50% of fatal accidents involved alcohol; alcohol re-
lated accidents killed 737 people and injured 17,216; about 40,000
Pennsylvania citizens were arrested for driving under the influ-
ence. 125 In addition, in this case, an innocent victim has been ren-
dered a quadriplegic because of La Belle's actions.
Pennsylvania Attorney General Ernie Preate2 s recently re-
marked that:
defendant's breath. Id. The trooper performed a field sobriety test which the defendant
failed. Id at 1229-30. The defendant was placed under arrest, and the police transported
him to the hospital for a blood test. Id at 1230. The hospital staff tested the defendant's
blood at 10:10 p.m. Id. The test revealed that the defendant had a blood alcohol level of
.114% Id.
123. 529 Pa 101, 601 A2d 1233 (1992). In Modaffare, the defendant at 2:30 a.m. struck
a parked car. Modaflare, 601 A2d at 1234. The defendant and his passenger were trans-
ported to the hospital to receive treatment for injuries sustained in the accident. Id at 1234.
The state police requested the defendant to submit to a blood test, and the defendant com-
plied with this request. Id. The hospital staff performed the blood test at 4:20 a.m. Id. The
test revealed that the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .108% Id.
124. Jarman, 601 A2d at 1230; Modaffare, 601 A2d at 1235. These two decision have
been labeled the "chug and drive" defense by State Representative Jeffery E. Piccola,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. United Press International, Officials Pledge to
Fight Court Decisions on Drinking Laws (September 29, 1992). Piccola noted that it is now
impossible for the Commonwealth to obtain convictions for DUI unless witnesses testify as
to the exact time the defendant drank. United Press International, Officials Pledge to Fight
Court Decisions on Drinking Laws (September 29, 1992).
125. Center for Highway Safety of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation,
The Traffic Accident Facts and Statistics Report (1992).
126. Attorney General Ernie Preate in 1988 criticized Judge Harhut of the Court of
Common Pleas of Lackawanna County for dismissing La Belle on double jeopardy grounds.
United Press International, Superior Court Reverse DUI Decision (October 3, 1988). Subse-
quently, the Lackawanna County's judges filed an ethics complaint against Preate with the
Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because of his harsh criticism of
Judge Harhut. United Press International, Superior Court Reverse DUI Decision (October
3, 1988).
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We seem to have a supreme court that thinks of itself as a judicial Christo-
pher Columbus on a constant voyage of discovery searching-for new rights
to grant to defendants. 27
In this case, the supreme court searched and discovered the doc-
trine of res judicata. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the
doctrine of res judicata to the La Belle case by judicial fiat that
resulted in a defendant escaping criminal charges without a trial to
determine his guilt or innocence.12 8 This case represents an insult
to all victims of drunk drivers.
John M. Mulcahey
127. United Press International, Officials Pledge to Fight Court Decisions on Drink-
ing Law (September 29, 1992).
128. Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion in Ashe considered the use of res judicata
(collateral estoppel) in criminal law as "strange." Ashe, 397 US at 464 (Burger Dissenting).
He argued that res judicata was justified in civil cases to avoid wasting judicial resources. Id.
Res judicata was also used in civil law to conserve the resources of the parties of the suit. Id.
Justice Burger asserted that in criminal cases "finality and conservation of private, public,
and judicial resources are lesser values than in civil litigation." Id.
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